**Nick Sekunda – keynote**

**‘The agēma and the other peltastai’: Origins of the Élite Antigonid
Infantry Regiments’.**

**Alex Elliott**

**Collapse and Recovery: The Later Roman Navy (3rd – 5th Centuries CE)**

 “All naval historians of the ancient world agree that Roman sea power had been run down to almost nothing by the late 4th century CE, and most pass over the next couple of centuries in a few sentences.” Macgeorge’s (2002) dismissive comments concerning the late Roman navy reflect what little has been written concerning the topic, and the current attitude toward it. Remarkably few scholars have studied ancient Roman naval history, and the few who have focus largely on the early imperial period before dismissing the topic after the 3rd century. As a result, there has been no scholarship which focuses exclusively on the Roman navy of late antiquity, as current scholarship has largely dismissed it without study. Last year I completed a Honours Thesis entitled, **Collapse and Survival: The Roman Navy in Late Antiquity 355 – 468** which argued against current scholarship, and instead, for the continued existence of a well maintained and functional Roman navy well into the late Roman period. This Masters’ thesis not only argues for its continued existence, but aims to understand the transition from an Augustan naval defense system to that of the late empire over the course of the tumultuous 3rd century. It is my intention to develop an accurate timeframe for this evolution, uncover the reasons for its implementation, as well as provide an in-depth analysis of this system’s organization and function in the late Roman world.

**Julian Gieseke**

**Roman disciplina vs Gallic θυμός: A Greek view on Celtic warriors in comparison during the late Roman Republic**

If we think of the ancient Celts at war today, we still do so very much under the influence of the motifs and *topoi* of the Graeco-Roman authors who described them in the last two centuries of the Roman Republic. The first name that comes to mind will always be Caesar, who conquered most of Gaul in less than a decade and composed the famous *Commentarii de Bello Gallico* so that everyone in the Roman world would learn about his exploits. However, in spite of the prominence the *Commentarii* still enjoy today, my contribution will focus on the writings of Greek authors. It was in the ethnographical thought of the Greeks, a tradition stretching back to Herodotus that the dominant ideas and stereotypes about the ancient Celts were born. As much as Caesar learned about the Gauls at first hand, as little was he interested in describing their customs and way of life. After all, the *Commentarii* were not about the Gauls, they were about Gaius Iulius Caesar.

In contrast to Caesar, the Greek tradition firmly believed that Celtic warfare could only be completely understood once seen as a part of their character and their style of living, which themselves were determined by the topography and climate of their homes. Amongst the most important contributors to such a Celtic ethnography were Polybius, Posidonius and Strabo. In my presentation I will draw on their descriptions of Celtic warriors to reconstruct the Greek image of these alleged “Barbarians” in the second and first century BC. Particular emphasis will be put on their usage of comparisons: Were the Celtic warriors or their equipment put into relation with other known “Barbarian” warrior cultures such as the Iberians or the Ligurians? Did the Greek authors reflect on the influences of Celtic warfare on Greeks and Romans? And did they go on to compare their own styles of fighting and armour with that of the Celts? These questions will guide my analysis as I try to show the Greek image of Celts at war in the context of the former’s own Hellenic background and traditions.

**Briana King**

**She’s a Lover, not a Fighter: Why Sexual Experience Disqualified the Ancient Greek Woman from Warfare**

Why, in ancient Greek culture, was violence acceptable in females provided the female was a virgin? The virgin goddesses Athena and Artemis, for instance, possess distinctly masculine, violent attributes, yet they were not condemned by a society that draws strict lines between the conventional spheres of men and those of women. The Amazons were not perceived as man-hating virgins but for their sexual congresses and independence they were deemed unnatural. Yet there is a tradition in the Near East wherein sexuality and martial ability were not divergent qualities. Babylonian Inanna/Ishtar and Phoenician Astarte, for example, were goddesses of both love and war. Significantly, these goddesses are the ancestors of the Greeks’ Aphrodite, and she herself once possessed this dual personality. Moreover, the purported ancestors of the Amazons, the Scythians, worshipped their own goddess influenced by these Near Eastern goddesses and equated with Aphrodite, Argimpasa,

But once firmly a Greek goddess Aphrodite was stripped of her role in warfare. No longer could a sexually awakened female also possess warrior prowess; such an attribute was reserved for female virgins. And if, as in the case of the Amazons, a female was to engage in both sex and warfare, she was regarded as alien/an enemy. Why did the Greeks find women and warfare mutually exclusive?

This paper will examine the Near Eastern precedents for the attitudes of Greeks towards the Amazons based on the relationship between sex and violence as manifested in the Near Eastern goddesses and subsequently developed in the Scythian Argimpasa and the Greek Aphrodite. The portrayal of warrior women as exemplified by the Amazons and Aphrodite reveals a preoccupation with resolving the conflict of sexually experienced women who were also martially capable. Should the battle of the sexes be as unbalanced on the battlefield as it is in the bedroom?

–

**Lennart Gilhaus**

**Laughing at the Enemy : Malicious Joy and Mockery in Xenophon’s historical works**

War is a serious matter: The extant Greek historians of fifth and fourth centuries BCE examined war from the viewpoint of the generals and concentrated their work on politics, strategy and tactics. The perspective of the victims of war and of the simple soldiers was of no relevance and thus suppressed. But even though authors like Thucydides and Xenophon wanted to explain operations as deliberate and rational choices of the strategists, they also paid attention to the power of emotions. Hate, anger, desire for revenge, but also pity and sympathy were presented as strong motives and important consequences of actions.

However, the Greek historians seldom mentioned joy, especially malicious enjoyment, and mockery, these emotional expressions are virtually absent in Thucydides. On the contrary, the attic orator often spoke about the enjoyment their opponents experienced from the suffering of others. Malicious joy is also a common theme in Greek comedy. Even theoretical treatises touched the issue. Even it is no central theme in Xenophon, he is far more frequently concerned with mockery and derision than Thucydides. In my paper, I will explore the instances where Xenophon speaks about malicious joy and evaluate its importance as motive within his historiographical works and as cultural factor in the warfare of Classical Greece.

**Martine Diepenbroek**

**Aeneas Tacticus’ fire-signalling and the German ADFGX and ADFGVX ciphers.**

Analysis of fire-signalling as discussed by the 4th century BCE strategist Aeneas Tacticus and its anticipation of the ADFGX and ADFGVX ciphers used by the German military intelligence in the First World War.

The principal aim of this paper will be to analyse key aspects and examples of the use of fire-signalling as discussed by Aeneas Tacticus, and its anticipation of the ADFGX and ADFGVX ciphers used in the First World War.

In a now lost work on military preparations, the 4th century BCE strategist Aeneas Tacticus discussed a method for fire-signalling in secret communication, whereby water-clocks and torches were used. A description of this method can be found in Polybius’ ‘*Histories*’ (Polybius, *Histories*. 10.44). Aeneas’ method was not only very laborious, but also open to errors. Therefore, Polybius improved the method (Polybius, *Histories*, 10.45.6-12). Out of Polybius’ method, a modern cryptographic device developed, called the ‘Polybius-square’ or ‘Polybius checkerboard’. Modern cryptographers have written numerous works in which the Polybius square is referenced (Smith, 1955, 16; Kahn, 1996b, 76-77; 82-83; Mollin, 2005, 9-10; Mollin, 2006, 89). Yet, none of these scholars seem to fully appreciate the Polybius square’s origins, nor do they recognize the ways in which it directly anticipates the ADFGX and ADFGVX ciphers that were used by the German military intelligence in the First World War. The aim of the current study is to show the relevance of understanding the ancient history of the Polybius square; and the merits of applying this to a modern context, namely, the use of the square in the ADFGX and ADFGVX ciphers. Analysing the remarks of Aeneas Tacticus and Polybius on fire-signalling as a starting point, in this paper I will first explore the ancient use of fire-signalling, and its development into the Polybius square. This will be followed by a discussion on the development of the Polybius square into the ADFGX and ADFGVX ciphers that were used by the German military intelligence services in the First World War. Hereby I will show the ways in which ancient Greek fire-signalling anticipates modern communication security.

**Carlo Lualdi**

**Roman gentilician memory, victory celebration and Macedonian shield types: the denar of Lucius Aemilius Paullus Lepidus, an update.**

Abstract : Roman republican coin types can be considered as an useful source about the development of Roman figurative language. If we consider that the Roman gentilician identity was strictly related to the patrician memories and to the celebration of the successes achieved by family members in the past, we can consider the existence of a set of iconographic models related to specific historical events well known by the Roman audience . These iconographies could be also reproduced on coin issue by the tresviri monetales, the magistrates responsible for minting in Rome, in order to remember past family glories with political aims. About this topic the reverse coin type of the Denar minted during 63 B.C. by Lucius Aemilus Lepidus Paullus can offer an interesting case study. Recent studies suggested that this iconography could be related to an iconography dated to the second half of the II century b.C. Moreover it is argued that this iconography was probably related to the celebration of Lucius Aemilius Paullus’ military success during the Third Macedonian War. In order to verify this hypothesis we put in place a wide multidisciplinary analysis including the recent material evidence related to the Macedonian shield types and the literary accounts about Lucius Aemilius Paullus’ triumph in Rome during 167 b.C. The present study brought us to identify two new reverse con types of Lepidus Paullus’ coin issue not previously mentioned by modern scholars. The analysis of these iconography offers an update about roman memory related to celebration of past warfare event troughs numismatics.

**Eleni Krikona**

**Phalanx and political rights in the late 7th century BCE Athens**

The present paper addresses the way the hoplites’ phalanx is associated with the development of the notion of equality in the early archaic Athens, and the demand of the wealthy farmers of non-aristocratic descendance for equal distribution of political power. Given the fact that the hoplites were considered equal within the phalanx and their victory meant equal distribution of the spoils after the battle (for example weapons, animals, lands), this feeling of equality was expanded gradually to the political life as well. By the time of Draco only the aristocrats took decisions regarding public affairs in the Athenian state, and consequently exercised exclusively "political" power. However, after the aristocratic warfare changes to a hoplite one, the demand of these wealthy non-aristocrat farmers to be considered by the Athenian aristocrats as politically equal to them, leads to the reforms of Draco in 621/0 BCE, according to which the Athenian citizenry is officially defined, incorporating all the hoplite body. The paper aims at interpreting the way, through which the incorporation of the wealthy non-aristocrats into the citizen body was made possible, by focusing on the Athenian law regarding the so-called *orgeones*, mentioned by Philochoros (Jacoby, FGrHist. iiiB, 328, Fr 35a: «*ηοσς δέ θράηορας ἐπάναγκες δέτεζθαι καί ηούς ὀργεῶνας καί ηούς ὁμογάλακηας οὕς γεννήηας καλοῦμεν*»), and concludes by interpreting the so-called ‘*hoplite Democracy’* (Aristotle’s’ *Politics* 1297b 1-24) as well as the constitutional transition of the Athenian state from an Aristocracy to an Oligarchy at the time of Draco.

**Silvannen Gerrard**

**‘Where’s my Elephant?’**

**Seleucus’ 500 War-Elephants and the Battle of Ipsus (301 B.C.)**

 In around 306/305 B.C., during the chaotic events of the Wars of the Diadochi following Alexander the Great’s death (323/322 B.C.), as each of his ambitious generals fought for power, Seleucus clashed with Chandragupta, the Mauryan ruler of northern India, whilst campaigning in the east. Although details of this expedition are scarce, the two rulers are believed to have subsequently agreed a treaty in which Seleucus ceded several eastern satrapies in return for 500 war-elephants. This unparalleled number of war-elephants would go on to play a pivotal role in the battle of Ipsus (301 B.C.), in what has often been lauded as the greatest success of the Hellenistic war-elephant. Decisively putting an end to Antigonus Monophthalmus’ bid for supremacy, and leading to a gradual stabilisation of the three kingdoms (Macedonian, Seleucid, Ptolemaic) which were to define the Hellenistic period (ca. 323/2-146 B.C.), the battle of Ipsus and the forces that were utilised in it are of extreme importance to historians of this period.

 Nevertheless, in line with the relatively low opinion of the war-elephant in the modern scholarship, Seleucus’ trade with Chandragupta has been received with mixed reaction, with some criticising its overall wisdom. In particular, the significantly large number of elephants Seleucus allegedly received has been called into question, most notably by W.W. Tarn, who has dismissed it as nothing more than an idealised Indian trope.

 Such criticisms, however, do injustice to the symbolic nature of this trade, as well as the complex socio-political dynamics that are so fundamental to the Hellenistic period. Not only was this an era characterised by instability and the constant need for rulers to demonstrate their prowess, but the war-elephant also carried symbolic resonance in Indian culture. This paper therefore intends to address the matter of Seleucus’ 500 elephants, by going beyond Tarn’s suggestions and assessing the matter from the angle of prestige and power projection. I thus intend to synthesise both the practical military considerations, as well as the symbolic significance of such a gift in an era where the presentation of kingship was of extreme importance.

**Jo Ball**

**Winning the War by Any Means: Reassessing pitched battle in Roman warfare**.

Roman warfare has typically been characterised as dominated by the pitched battle in the field, where a Roman army faced off against an enemy force in a decisive encounter. This approach has shaped the way that the organisation and field operation of the Roman army has been reconstructed, characterising it as a monolithic "war machine" which dominated the battlefield. However, this picture may have developed not as a reflection of military reality, but as a historiographical consequence of literary convention in the writing of ancient warfare.

However, the archaeological discovery of numerous conflict sites across Europe and the Near East suggest that pitched battle may not have been the principle method by which the Roman army fought its enemies. Of the discovered sites, only one is a pitched battle - Baecula (208BC) in Spain - while the rest are a range of ambushes, skirmishes, and transient installation assault sites. Most of these engagements are undocumented in the surviving historical record, but can be identified and narratively reconstructed through the fighting-deposited artefact scatter left behind by the battle. Their frequency in the archaeological record suggests that pitched battle was far from the most common fighting situation encountered by the Roman army. It may be that Roman warfare should instead be characterised as a sequence of lower-intensity engagements punctuated at long intervals by formal battles in the field. If this is the case, it may impact our understanding of the organisation and operation of the Roman army in the field; however, the Roman army clearly found low-intensity fighting to be an effective way to win their wars.

This paper explores the archaeological and historical evidence for the role of pitched battle and lower-intensity fighting in Roman warfare, approaching the issue both from the perspective of the Romans and their enemies, and the consequences this reassessment has on our understanding of Roman warfare.

**David Rafferty**

**Legati from Arausio to Caesar**

By the first century BCE the position of legatus had a long history in Roman warmaking. Nominated by the commanding general but confirmed by the Senate, legati were normally of senatorial rank themselves. But beginning in the Social War (91-88 BCE), they began to be used differently. In that war, the Roman practice was to use multiple independent legati (who were men of significant military experience and reputation) under the loose coordination of the consuls. This model (broadly similar to that used by Pompeius in 67) was revived by Sulla in 83 and again by Caesar in 49 for use in civil wars fought across vast distances. Yet their legati were politically very different, chosen for their personal loyalty and without reference to the Senate. This model allowed flexibility while keeping overall control with the senior commander. It also had problems, such as the difficulty in rewarding legati with triumphs to which they were not legally entitled. These political aspects have been recognised by scholars.

Despite the different political circumstances, the similar command structures used in the Social and civil wars raises the possibility that military efficiency was the important factor. Caesar (BCiv. 3.51) noted the very different expectations held of commanders and legati, which points to the feasibility of combined operations. The possible connection with tactical reform in the late second century (and the disaster at Arausio) is suggestive. This paper will investigate both the political and military aspects of the use of legati in the Social War and by Sulla and Caesar.

**Idit Sagiv**

**Cavalry on Engraved Gems**

The horseman was one of the most common images in Roman Imperial iconography. Rider figures appear in sculpture in the round, in relief, painting and the minor arts, among them engraved gems. During the Greek and Roman periods engraved gems were used as seals, jewellery, and amulets. The various images carved on the gems, represented gods, mythological themes, famous sculptures, astrological signs, and portraits. Many of the images are no longer familiar to us, and research, based on ancient literary sources, is required in order to interpret their meanings. In their own time, the depictions on the gems were meaningful and often symbolic. The primary function of engraved gems (intaglios) lay in their use to create an icon in relief on clay or wax, which could be identified and whose role was to validate the act of signing. Gems were highly appreciated in ancient times in general and in the Graeco-Roman world in particular.

Five engraved gemstones in the collection of Classical Archaeology of the Israel Museum, Jerusalem, depict horsemen on galloping horses, holding spears in their arms. We can learn about ancient warfare from those depictions on engraved gems. Depictions of cavalry holding a spear, not associated with the image of a certain god, are known on sarcophagi, gravestones, monuments and imperial gems. In most cases those riders are depicted galloping during a battle. The rider motif, echoing mounted mythological heroes like Bellerophon, probably served to commemorate cavalry who died in battle, and also symbolized their bravery and courage.

Depictions of what is called in research “Heros Equitans” are very similar to depictions of the rider on gems. This rider presents a heroic figure without a special name, which is typically depicted riding on horseback. During their lives these heroes were characterized by physical strength and courage. With their deaths, the heroes were worshiped, and their burial place became sacred. “Heros Equitans” is often identified on figured monuments with various divinities. Perhaps the figure of “Heros Equitans”, which was very common in Greece and the surrounding area, is the one who inspired the depictions of the emperors and horsemen on gems.

 The Roman engraved gems featuring horsemen drew their inspiration from established Greek rider imagery. Under the Roman Empire, the rider image became the preserve of that new divine figure, the emperor. The Imperial rider combined the attributes of a Bellerophon or the Dioscuri of the Classical period and an Alexander of the Hellenistic.

Also, Gauls are fairly common in art and there are quite a number of Celtic/Gaulish horsemen on gems. Presumably, people wore such gems as a reminder of the iconic defeat of the Northern barbarians by the Attalids and more recent Roman triumphs.

**Jussi Rantala**

**‘War Crimes’ in Roman Conquest of Italy: an Augustan Perspective**

History of the Roman Republic, as we know it from later historiography, is characterized by almost constant warfare. This is not surprising as such: while the period witnessed the rather violent rise of Rome from being a mere city-state to the leadership of whole Italy, Roman historiography was also by its very nature mostly interested in ‘great deeds’ – particularly actions conducted during wars.

My paper examines descriptions of war atrocities taking place during the centuries from the birth of the Republic to the beginning of the First Punic War, as recorded by writers of the Augustan era, particularly historians. Thus, it covers the period when Rome became the master of Italy by conquest. Firmly keeping in mind that the idea of ‘war crime’ is a modern concept with modern connotations (hence the quotation marks), I’ll examine and compare the reports in Roman historiography about actions such as violence against civilians and prisoners of war, pillage, rape, plunder, and so on, and look for traces of ethical codes applied in warfare by Augustan historians.

The primary aim of my paper is not to concentrate on ‘real’ war atrocities of the Republican era, but rather to examine their representation and ideas of ethics in warfare in Augustan cultural context. While I do examine, classify and compare the various ‘war crimes’ reported by historians, my main focus is to analyse those descriptions against the contemporary social and political situation of Augustan period: for example, how might the tales of ‘war crimes’ of the Republic reflect war atrocities which took place in Augustan civil war, of which the contemporary historians even had personal experiences? How do the stories about struggles between Rome and Italian tribes and ‘war crimes’ of those wars fit with Augustan political ideology, highlighting the *tota Italia* – Italy as a single *Patria* of those same Italian tribes, and with the debate during Augustan period about the cultural relationship between Rome and the rest of Italy?

**Phyllis Brighouse**

**VIRTUS IN SPACE – FUTURISTIC WARFARE AND QUALITIES OF THE VIR AS DISPLAYED BY THE CHARACTER ‘VIR’ IN THE TV SERIES BABYLON 5**

Babylon 5 is a 1990s 5-season Sci-fi TV series describing the involvement of a futuristic Tower of Babel in a futuristic war. Inhabited by humans and a wide variety of alien species, Babylon 5 is a 5-mile long, half-a-mile wide United Nations in Space, with trade, with a Council of Ambassadors to keep the peace and facilitate trade. War threatens both Council unity and the existence of the station itself.

The message of the series is that people always have choice in their actions concerning warfare, and that wrong choices can be replaced with better ones.

One alien species on Babylon 5 is Centauri Prime, a patriarchal Empire in decline. With its seers, a wide variety of gods and an emperor with all the qualities of Caligula, Centauri can be identified with the decline of the Roman Empire.

Vir Cotto is Aide to Londo Mollari, Centauri Ambassador to Babylon 5. As his name suggests, Vir’s nature displays the Roman quality of virtus. He is courageous, honest, modest, steadfast, and when tested displays a willingness to shoulder his responsibilities as a righteous citizen.

A Centauri seer predicts Mollari’s choices will lead to war, and Mollari is urged to choose again. He does not, but becomes dictatorial when the predicted war escalates into genocide. Vir’s choices, however, display virtus. He urges Mollari to make nobler choices, and defies Mollari’s terrifying ally. When Vir realises his inaction makes him implicit in genocide he chooses again. Courageously defying Mollari he secretly rescues many suffering enemies. Because of Mollari’s choices, Centauri ultimately falls, and it is Vir who is left to re-civilise his world.

Vir’s identification with the Roman ideal enables the creator of Babylon 5 to display to his audience a reception of ancient Rome against the backdrop of a futuristic war.

# Miguel Pachón

# **The Iranian campaign of 317/16 B.C.E and the Epigonoi.**

Diodorus Siculus, in his narration of the campaigns that Antigonus the One-eyed waged against Eumenes, mentions some mysterious Pantodapoi, which have been discussed several times before, yet their nationality seems to keep on eluding us. I’ll try to put forward the idea that these men were part of the infamous regiment of Iranians Alexander recruited and trained to fight like Macedonians and that prompted the mutiny at Opis. These men, I’d say, had already fought for Macedonian generals like Perdiccas before, and those that survived still saw battle in the Iranian campaign. The Macedonians, even tough they didn’t seem to be happy to accept the Iranians as equals, may have been forced to field them and recruit more of them because of several reasons, like the lack of proper Macedonians and Greeks they could have fielded instead. Diodorus’ narration of the events may be the most detailed, yet he may not have been the only one leaving semi-hidden mentions of these famous Persians, and thus Plutarch’s work on Eumenes and Justin epitome of Pompeius Trogus’ now lost works may play a key role in this research. I will also try to compare their possible situation with later recruitments of natives like the famous reform Ptolemy IV carried before the battle of Raphia.

Dr. Emma Ljung Princeton University | Santa Susana Archaeological Project

Aitolians abroad: economic motivations for mercenary service and the consequences of post-war homeland evacuation.

Mercenary service was not invented in the Hellenistic period, but it was a prominent feature with vast cultural, social, and economic consequences which helped shape the Hellenistic world. Mercenary soldiers traveled across great distances and spent years, sometimes decades, abroad. Inevitably, their migratory lifestyle affected both their homeland and the foreign territories in which they served. Prominently featured in Hellenistic mercenary armies were the Aitolians who served in almost every royal army in every corner of the Greek world. Paid to fight, Aitolians marched for Ptolemies, Seleucids, Antigonids, and whomever else was willing to meet their salary requirements.

With that salary came other, less obvious, economic benefits. The further one traveled, the greater the chances of fame and fortune, as great wealth could be amassed on strange shores. For example, the infamous Aitolian general Skopas was paid the unparalleled salary of ten minae per day in his extended service to the Ptolemies. The financial attraction of foreign service was amplified by an economic crisis at home as the Aitolian koinon repeatedly engaged in exhausting wars, and by the end of the 3rd century B.C.E., thousands of Aitolians chose mercenary service in search of better fortune. While some did, many of these Aitolian mercenaries never returned to their homeland.

Against the background of Aitolia’s economic crisis this paper traces the trajectories by which this migration of adult males occurred, and evaluates their choice of mercenary service within its socio-economic parameters. It thus offers a new understanding of the Aitolia federation’s subsequent hostility toward Rome. Moreover, this paper briefly discusses the geography of mercenary service as a vital part of the internationalization of Hellenistic society and the cultural consequences of voluntary migration.

**Krzysztof Zimny**

**Lords of War: The Strategoi and State Control of Cross-border Violence in the Akhaian League**

 In the Greek federal states a tension existed between military powers of the highest magistrates and the assembly and the Akhaian League was no exception. Although decisions about war and all-out mobilization were generally restricted for the general assembly, practice demanded greater scope of independence to be given to the strategos. The present paper examines how the League conformed to these practical demands.

 Examination of akhaian mobilizations and military expeditions reveals that competences of the League’s constitutional bodies seemingly overlapped in many fields. Partially it is due to biographical bias of our sources, but not every example can be explained by preoccupation with the great politicians. Both Aratos and Philopoimen called out general levies in times of peace without consulting the assembly and lead it into foreign territory. On legal ground, the strategos had nearly complete authority over the standing forces and exercised some control over actions on the polis level (e.g. rysia). The key role seems to be played more by their political preeminence than formal competences and this is corroborated by their private raids. Powerful politicians could count on obedience of their co-citizens and avoid censure for possible abuses – success being the ultimate yardstick. This together with the need of rapid answer to emerging threats meant, that assembly was exclusively necessary only to label an armed expedition “war”, while in certain situations eminent men could bypass it as circumstances and their ambitions demanded.

 To some extent these conclusions seem to be in agreement with situation in other Greek states as athenian controversies surrounding naval raiding by trierarkhoi show.

**Bertrand Augier**

**Officers and gentlemen : military competence during the Roman civil wars (49-31 a.C.).**

This paper aims to study the Roman officer’s military competence during the civil wars (49-31 a.C.). First going back to Clausewitz’ conception of military genius, it can be considered that military knowledge was less technical at the top of the military hierarchy than at the bottom. It was mainly an intellectual activity, sustained by the military leader’s character and good temper, which allowed his understanding to keep sovereignty. In the late Republican period, the Roman commanders had to display intelligence, experience, reflexion, more than physical courage. In the armies of the time, which were complex and highly hierarchical organisation, one central problem was then the military value and competences of the hierarchical levels beneath the military leader, namely the officers, legates, quaestors, military tribunes or prefects. Most of the specialists of the late republican Roman army underlined the mediocrity of their military cadres, particularly the military tribunes, even if L. De Blois’ works qualified this opinion. By contrast, the valour and military competence of individuals such as Labienus or Statilius Taurus, at a higher level of the exercitus, could be highly praised. This paper will first show that technical expertise was by no mean expected from most of the officers during the civil wars. Then it will study their behaviour during military operations, known from literary sources, as part of representation conventions, instead of using a modern vision of what an officer’s duty was. The paper will develop a constructivist model of competence, inspired by the works of sociologists such as L. Boltanski, showing that the officers’ military aptitudes were mainly ethical, constituting an acceptable behaviour for an aristocrat and justifying their military pre-eminence over the troops.

Davide Morassi

**Morale in Classical Greece**

This paper aims to investigate and clarify the importance and the nature of morale in Ancient Greek warfare, focusing particularly on the 5th and 4th centuries BC.

After providing a brief introduction of what is intended by morale in this study – the balance of emotions of a military contingent, usually the result of the overall feelings amidst the individual emotional states of comrades –, the attention dedicated by several authors to the soldiers’ emotions will be underlined (e.g. Thucydides 4.96.5; Xenophon, Anabasis 3.1.3; Aeneas Tacticus 26.7-8), as well as the effects of morale on the fight (Thucydides 2.2.3, 5.9.2; Xenophon, Anabasis 3.1.39-40), and how much it influenced the battle outcome (Thucydides 5.1.2; Xenophon, Anabasis 2.2.4; Cyropaedia 3.3.19).

The focus will be, thus, turned to the nature of the phenomenon, recognising four major elements in its articulation: short-term conditions - for example exhaustion (Xenophon, Anabasis 6.11-12), motivation through ideals (Tyrtaeus 10 West; Herodotus 6.14), comradery (Aristotle, Politics 1272a), and self-confidence (Thucydides 2.86.6; Xenophon, Anabasis 3.2.12, 16; Diodorus 13.11.1).

The paper will, thus, observe that the results attained through this analysis do not diverge from the modern formulation of morale. Although the academic community still does not agree on a unique and precise formulation of the phenomenon, Manning’s theory reached a considerable consensus concerning the main elements of morale: motivation, cohesion, esprit de corpe, which, following the reconstruction presented earlier in the paper, arguably were also the main agents of morale in ancient contexts. This similarity suggests an interesting and debatable interrogative; could the modern concept of morale be applied to an ancient context, notwithstanding the undeniable anachronism and methodological issues? And if this is possible, could it be a valid example for the way in which modern psychology can be applied to the study of ancient history?

**Alessandro Brambilla**

**The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia and Warfare**

Since its discovery, the so-called Hellenica Oxyrhynchia aroused much interest among modern scholars. Beside the lively debate on authorship, a great deal of studies examined the historiographical tradition and the problems connected with the papyri. Besides, other topics have been investigated in depth, e.g. the political interests of the author and his curiosity towards constitutional features. However, less attention has been devoted to a thorough investigation of the military interests expressed.

Even though we can only read a limited portion of the entire work, many accounts of different war-related events can be found in the Hellenica, and some scholars have even praised the skill demonstrated by the author in describing these episodes. For instance, Iain Bruce emphasized his attention for details, particularly in relating the movements of Agesilaus’ army in Persia, while Paul McKechnie and Stephen Kern underlined his interest in stratagems, and Paul Cartledge even described him as “a good military historian”. Nevertheless, all these observations are rather unsystematic, and we still lack a proper assessment of the interest showed by the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia in war-related matters.

This paper aims at partially filling this gap, trying to determine whether the author of the Hellenica can be rightfully considered a military historian. A careful reading of few chapters of the work will allow to confirm his attention to details and to some tactical aspects (stratagems, maneuvers, peculiar deployments). At the same time, however, these military interests are not prominent in the overall structure of the Hellenica and are indeed counterbalanced by the curiosity towards political, constitutional and economic aspects, thus suggesting a certain caution in employing the label “military historian” to define the author.

**Pau Valdés Matías**

**Tracing the logistics of the Roman Army: the Roman encampment of La Palma and the Second Punic War**

The logistics of the Republican army has been the object of several studies in recent years. Of particular relevance have been the works of Erdkamp and Roth. However, this revaluation of the field has been through the study of classical authors, relegating archaeology to a secondary role. From our point of view, this approach has generated a partial vision of the Roman military effort. Therefore, in our paper we propose an interdisciplinary approach to logistics combining the written sources with the archaeological evidences.

Our study will focus on some aspects of the logistics of the Roman army during the Second Punic War in the Iberian Peninsula. In the first place, the new archaeological evidences will provide a new interpretation for the Roman strategy and the role played by camps and several enclaves. In the second place, archaeological evidences can provide new information regarding the role played by loot in the logistics of the army. Finally, we will consider the different relationships that were established between the different theaters of operations during the war.

**Jakub Witowski**

**[...]O'er the fall'n trunk his ample shield display'd, He hides the hero with his mighty shade[...] -**

**Martial votive offerings in Archaic and Classical Greece as a propaganda instruments.**

Doubtless, war was one of the most important factors forming identity and social awarness

of the Greeks from the erliest times. It's not suprising that behaviours connected with militarism

played important role in their religious life. Archeological data provide abundance of proofs

testifying crucial role was fulfilled by elements of weaponry in religious rites since Bronze Age.

Despite still insufficient state of research there are some evidence which make us think that

weapons could be used for wiping out some "inconvenient actualities" from social awarness. Fact of

correlaton between lack of weaponry and presence of human remains having evidence of injuries

inflicted during the fight ( and conversely) in some Mycenaean tombs, may serve as ans exemple of such behaviour. Development of defined sacred space understood as a sanctuary and emergence of panhelenism in the Archaic period were favorable for exchangig diversified communiques between groups of people. Besides few historical sources concerning votive offerings connected with war dated on late Archaic nad Classical period, We have to deal with remains of military equipment devoted to the gods .Although their ritual and purely religious role leave no doubts, more meticulous analysis indicate that some votive offerings may have been used as a propaganda instuments. This view seems to be confirmed by traces remained on parts of armaments and esspecially by pressence of specific inscriptions.

The focal point of above lecture will be demonstration of arguments supporting thesis that

widely understood sacred space was also place of rivalry which took place outside the battlefields.It's worth to emphasize that one of the purposes of mentioned lecture will be also making an attempt to justify basing on archeological sources, that usage of parts of weaponry for propaganda goals may have had its origin as far back as Bronze Age and dissemination of this phenomena is connected with evolution of sanctuaries in the Archaic and Classical Period.

**Anna Magdalena Blomley**

**Defending The Greek City State : Rural Fortifications In The Classical And Hellenistic Argolid.**

Even today, the landscape of the Argolid – comprising of the ancient city states of Argos,

Epidauros, Halieis, Hermion and Troizen – is visually dominated by urban and rural fortifications.

Nearly 150 fortified sites dating mostly to the Late Classical and Hellenistic period have so far

been recorded, making this region of the north-eastern Peloponnese one of the most densely

fortified areas on the Greek mainland. However, unlike fortified structures in many other parts of

the Greek world, the fortifications in the Argolid have so far never been systematically studied and their functions remain largely unknown.

In this paper, I will present part of this little-known corpus of defensive sites and discuss their

functions by placing them in the context of their surrounding landscape. Using both conventional

approaches of on-site observation and modern GIS methods of data collection and analysis, I will

explore three aspects that have traditionally been viewed as central to military-strategic

fortifications in ancient Greece: Firstly, I will investigate questions of site visibility and

intervisibility to evaluate the fortifications’ potential as visual networks of watch-towers and signalstations.

Secondly, I will analyse the relationship between fortifications and routes of movements,

before thirdly turning to the possible role of fortified sites as border defences.

This investigation not only works towards a better understanding of the individual sites in the

region, but also casts new light on the different types of conflict in the Classical and Hellenistic

Peloponnese. Most importantly however, it will contribute to the wider debate whether we should aim to explain ancient rural fortifications as part of a city state’s “grand defensive scheme”, or view them primarily as defensive structures built for and by local rural communities within the larger city states.

**Jaume Noguera, Eduard Ble, Jordi López, Pau Valdés**

**Defining the presence of Carthaginian troops between the Ebro River and the Pyrenees during the Second Punic War**

The presence of the Carthaginian troops in the area between the Ebro and the Pyrenees has enjoyed a minor role in the studies on the Second Punic War. This is due to two reasons. In the first place, the presence of these armies has been linked to specific military campaigns, which means that they were in those areas for very short periods of time. In the second place, the problems related with the equipment and archaeological materials associated to a Carthaginian army. There is no clear definition of the cultural material that can be ascribed to it. However, the presence of currency has been pointed out as a possible indicator for the case of Andalusia (Chaves 1990) or Bruttium (Manfredi 2009).

Taking this premise as our starting point, in this work we will study the presence and distribution pattern of Carthaginian coinage in this area and how it can be related to the Punic armies and its movements in this area.

**Silvannen Gerrard**

**‘Where’s my Elephant?’**

**Seleucus’ 500 War-Elephants and the Battle of Ipsus (301 B.C.)**

 In around 306/305 B.C., during the chaotic events of the Wars of the Diadochi following Alexander the Great’s death (323/322 B.C.), as each of his ambitious generals fought for power, Seleucus clashed with Chandragupta, the Mauryan ruler of northern India, whilst campaigning in the east. Although details of this expedition are scarce, the two rulers are believed to have subsequently agreed a treaty in which Seleucus ceded several eastern satrapies in return for 500 war-elephants. This unparalleled number of war-elephants would go on to play a pivotal role in the battle of Ipsus (301 B.C.), in what has often been lauded as the greatest success of the Hellenistic war-elephant. Decisively putting an end to Antigonus Monophthalmus’ bid for supremacy, and leading to a gradual stabilisation of the three kingdoms (Macedonian, Seleucid, Ptolemaic) which were to define the Hellenistic period (ca. 323/2-146 B.C.), the battle of Ipsus and the forces that were utilised in it are of extreme importance to historians of this period.

 Nevertheless, in line with the relatively low opinion of the war-elephant in the modern scholarship, Seleucus’ trade with Chandragupta has been received with mixed reaction, with some criticising its overall wisdom. In particular, the significantly large number of elephants Seleucus allegedly received has been called into question, most notably by W.W. Tarn, who has dismissed it as nothing more than an idealised Indian trope.

 Such criticisms, however, do injustice to the symbolic nature of this trade, as well as the complex socio-political dynamics that are so fundamental to the Hellenistic period. Not only was this an era characterised by instability and the constant need for rulers to demonstrate their prowess, but the war-elephant also carried symbolic resonance in Indian culture. This paper therefore intends to address the matter of Seleucus’ 500 elephants, by going beyond Tarn’s suggestions and assessing the matter from the angle of prestige and power projection. I thus intend to synthesise both the practical military considerations, as well as the symbolic significance of such a gift in an era where the presentation of kingship was of extreme importance.

**Alexandra-Cătălina Pârvan**

**The funeral strife after the death of Alexander the Great**

All the Antiquity is characterized by the great importance of war and military conflicts, and motives may vary, but one of the most important reasons is power. Ancient literature abound with accounts of wars and some of them testify the reasons employed by the combatants in their battles.

In the evening of 323 BC, Alexander closed his eyes for the last time. After death, Alexander is transformed by his generals into an object that symbolizes power over the empire. As Curtius Rufus(X. 12) states "Without a sure heir to their king, without an hier to the throne, each man would be trying to draw public forces into his own power.”(translated by J.C.Rolfe 1971).

 It is true that for 18 months there were no conflicts between the Diádokhoi ( Diádokhoi/ Διάδοχοι is a greek word for successors), but these animosities would slowly make their way, and Alexander's body would become an apple of discord.

Alexander's generals were now divided into two major factions. On the one hand, Perdiccas in his role as regent supported by Seleucus and Eumenes, and on the other, Ptolemy, who was now a satrap of Egypt. Everybody's intention was to keep control of Alexander's body. His body was now the symbol of power, and obviously the one in his possession could prove and legitimate the role of leader of the empire and heir of Alexander. As Curtius Rufus(X. 20) states “This was an omen and the beginning of civil wars among the Macedonians”(translated by J.C.Rolfe, 1971).

Alexander's mummified body was an unimaginable centre of power. His successors tried fiercely to keep it under their control. The loss of Alexander's body brought death to Perdiccas. But to Ptolemy, the one who was able to keep the king's mummy in his hands all his life, brought him strength, riches, and the rank of king of Egypt.

We can follow the Ancient literature that focuses on the war of the Diádokhoi to understand the phenomenon produced by Alexander, and that the war of the Diádokhoi was in essence a funeral strife. The present paper aims to analyze the conflict of the Diádokhoi on the basis of ancient literature through the symbolism of Alexander's body. The proposed subject thus represents the possibility of a new introspection on the war in the Hellenistic world.

**John Serrati**

**Mars and Bellona as Roman War Deities**

War, society, and religion were all linked at Rome during the middle Republic, and this is evidentin the contemporary view of the divine. In this regard, Mars served as the most prominent Romanwar god. As Mars Gradivus, he was a god of battle who symbolised the militia, the area outside thepomerium, where enemies lay and where the legions operated. He was furthermore thepersonification of virtus in its meaning of manliness, civil duty, loyalty, and especially battlefieldcourage. Mars represented war as the main function of the male citizen during the period of themiddle Republic. At the same time, the Romans had another war deity: Bellona. Looking at onlythe evidence from the late Republic and beyond, Bellona appears as a primordial Roman wargoddess; examining an earlier period, however, yields an altogether different view of the goddess.In this period, Bellona appears in every respect to have been a war goddess of significant importance.As much as Mars represented duty and citizenship, Bellona represented the chaos, fear, and bloodof combat; her rites involved a cacophony of noise and in equal measure she could fortify courageor evoke terror. Furthermore, her temple came to be the locus of the fetial rite for declaring war, andthroughout the Republic, it was also the place where returning generals petitioned the patres for atriumph. Taken as a whole, evidence shows that she was indeed considered a major war deity. Thegoddess represented Roman warfare as a form of vengeance, and was also the personification ofcombat itself. Moreover, her femininity was not happenstance; as a woman, she brought specificelements to the intersection of religion and warfare, and these serve to provide us with insights intothe perception of the female at Rome, as well as the Roman concept of gender.

**Suzanne Lynch**

**Sexual Violence in Greek Epic and Tragic Accounts of the Trojan War**

Sexual violence plays a significant role in Greek epic and tragic accounts of the Trojan War,

particularly in Homer’s Iliad and Euripides’ Troades , Hecuba , and Andromache . During the ten

year siege of Troy, the Greek soldiers regularly raid and plunder the surrounding settlements,

killing men and carrying off women. The captive women are distributed as prizes ( gera ) to the

Greek heroes and commanders, whose beds they are forced to serve. The same fate awaits the

Trojan women in the besieged city - a fate which is foreshadowed in Homer’s Iliad and which

becomes a reality in Euripides’ tragedies.

Drawing on modern theories of wartime sexual violence, particularly Clark’s (2014) multi-causal

and multi-level analysis of wartime rape, this paper explores the dynamics of sexual violence in

Greek epic and tragic accounts of the Trojan War, considering why it happens and what

purpose it serves. It examines in particular the extent to which sexual violence functions as a

weapon of war in these accounts. Clark (2014) argued that there are multiple causes and

motivations behind sexual violence in war, which operate on different levels - the macro

(societal) level, the meso (group) level, and the micro (individual) level. On the societal level,

sexual violence is facilitated by patriarchal social structures where women occupy a subordinate

position to men in society. On the group level sexual violence occurs ultimately because it is

useful to armed groups and serves a variety of strategic purposes. On the individual level,

sexual violence occurs because the perpetrator actively decides to carry it out, for whatever

personal reasons. All of these levels coexist and each level interacts with the others. Clark’s

model is useful for understanding the causal factors of sexual violence in Homer’s and

Euripides’ accounts of the Trojan War, which I argue operate on the same societal, group, and

individual levels.

**Fabrizio Biglino**

**The size of Roman legions between the third and second century BC: military flexibility and demographic considerations**

The legion is the symbol of the Roman army and, as highlighted by key sources such as Polybius, Livy or Diodorus, Rome’s growth and expansion inevitably triggered changes in its armed forces, from their structure to their deployment to, of course, their size. Considering specifically the Republic period, Polybius’ book VI of his Histories describes what is considered the standard structure of the Roman army for that time, including the number of men recruited.

The premise of this paper is based on a suggestion by Peter Brunt: during the Second Punic War, due to the casualties sustained during the campaigns of 218-216 BC, the Romans deployed under-strength legions, a trend that continued until the end of the war. The literary evidence, however, does not support the presence of smaller legions and, on the contrary, even mentions larger legions in some instances. Hence, while the information on the strength of individual legions is scarce, it seems that it points toward the fact that it was more common increasing the manpower of a legion rather than decreasing it.

This paper will investigate the possibility that the Romans did deploy under-strength legions during the Second Punic War, and will especially explore the demographic consequences of such a decision; yet, contrary to Brunt, we will suggest that Rome maintained a degree of flexibility in terms of manpower throughout the second century BC. We will propose that the legions, ultimately, were not as standardized as previously believed. Given the importance attributed to heavy recruitment as one of the main burdens for Roman citizens by the sources and modern historians, the possibility of weaker legions offers an interesting provocation, particularly considering the demographic repercussions of military service.

**Hong Xu**

**Polybius on the causes of Wars and Realism**

The theory of the causality of wars in Polybius (Plb.3.6-7) consists of three components: aitia (cause); prophasis (pretext); arche (beginning). It is regarded by Momigliano and Walbank as too simple and mechanical in comparison with that in Thucydides (Thuc.1.23.5-6). In addition, Walbank, followed by McGing, suggests that Polybius does not always apply this formula in explaining the causes of wars in his work, and that the aitiai seem too unilateral and rigid to convey the responsibilities of all the parties involved. However, Derow argues that Polybian aitiai are not intended to be used for answering questions about responsibility or culpability, but for sorting out the factors that lead to the decisions for war.

In my view, previous scholars have not fully grasped the meaning of Polybius’ formula. They have mainly focused their discussions on the role of aitia, underplaying the other two components, prophasis and arche. In the surviving books of his Histories Polybius applies his theory repeatedly, e.g. to the Second Punic War, the Social War of 220-217 BC and the war between Rome and Antiochus III. Furthermore, in his identification of the specific factors (aitiai) leading to wars, he anticipates the ideas of the dominant theoretical model in modern political science, Realism, which claims that, because international relations are effectively anarchic, the behaviour of states is governed by the fundamental security dilemma that haunts them all.

This paper has three parts: firstly, it demonstrates that the three elements in Polybius’ theory of causality complement each other and each has its own function in his model; secondly, it highlights the differences between Polybius’ and Thucydides’ statements on the causes of wars, contrasting the use of aitia by both authors in order to clarify Polybius’ definition of aitia; thirdly, it analyzes Polybius’ views on the causes of war by examining the factors he identifies as contributing to the Persian Wars, the Social War, the Second Punic War and the war between Rome and Antiochus III, highlighting their “Realist” aspects.

**Giorgia Proietti**

**Coping with war trauma in ancient Greece.**

**The Persian Wars on the Athenian stage**

As a recent line of research shows (e.g. MEINECK-KONSTAN 2012), the modern category of trauma, and especially that of war trauma, can be fruitfully used to analyze anew post-war psychological and social dynamics in antiquity, and shed new light on the traumatic consequences of war for veterans and civilians. Though the modern characterization of war trauma as a type of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), inclusive of specific features and symptoms, cannot be taken for granted as a universal, and therefore cannot automatically be applied in retrospect to the ancient world, the notion of trauma allows us to consider ancient wars anew, posing new questions to the ancient evidence, figuring out new realities behind them, and, as a consequence, drawing a wider picture of the experience of war and its aftermath in antiquity.

This proposed paper pinpoints traces of collective war trauma in the representation of Persian wars-related events on the Athenian stage in the immediate aftermath of the war. Both the contents of Phrynicus' Sack of Miletus and Aeschylus' Persians, and the reactions shown by the Athenian civic community, which only in front of the latter reached the expected catharsis, illuminate the mechanisms, functions and goals of the tragic representation as a means to cope with war trauma, especially concerning the dramatic destruction of Athens (Sack of Miletus) and the unprecedented human losses (Persians).

**Dr. Jeroen Wijnendaele**

**Military Assassination in Early Byzantium (c. 395-520 CE)**

Political Murder was a recurring phenomenon in Roman history. Indeed, one could even go as far as demarcate several distinct eras with particular murders, such as those of the Gracchi brothers to usher in the Late Republic, Julius Caesar’s to herald the coming of Empire, and Julius Nepos’ to signal the end of Empire in the West. During the Early Empire, many incumbents of the imperial office saw a premature demise at the hands of their own trusted courtiers. In contrast, very few Late Roman emperors were actually murdered, especially eastern ones. However, from the death of Theodosius I (395) to the accession of Justinian (527), a surprisingly large number of military officials were assassinated, many by colleagues and some even on the emperor’s direct command. This is an astonishing phenomenon that has attracted relatively little attention in modern scholarship. Some of the reasons for this seem self-apparent.

While the death of Julius Caesar is arguable the most famous historical example of its kind, an event claimed by Greg Woolf to provide us with the single best documented day in Roman history, the late fourth to early sixth century suffer from comparative exhaustive coverage in the surviving source material. Furthermore, political and military analyses of this period have usually focussed on barbarian migrations and their contribution to the volatile cocktail formerly known as “the Fall of Rome”. This paper wishes to offer a prolegomenon to the study of political murder in Late Antiquity, by focussing on the assassination of imperial commanders during the reigns of eastern emperors from Arcadius to Justin I, with special attention to the role of bodyguards.

**Stephen O’Brien**

**The Murderous Dance of Ares: Violent Practices and Power in the Late Bronze Age Aegean**

And I know how to do the dance of Ares one-on-one.

- Iliad 7.241 (Translation by J.H. Lesher)

The art of the Aegean Late Bronze Age provides us with numerous depictions – often on seals or rings – of what appear to be small-scale armed combats: individuals or small groups with similar equipment, engaging in violence against one another. These might be understood as heroised scenes with a propagandistic intent, or as an artistic convention aimed at making the depiction of mass violence easier to render. The analysis of these scenes has therefore tended to take place within a conventional framework of warfare. However, such scenes must also be viewed in the context of other images from the period which show individualised or small-group violent practices: the “Boxer Fresco” from Akrotiri on Thera, the “Boxer Rhyton” from Ayia Triada on Crete, and most famously the “Bull-Leaper” fresco from Knossos. In this light, the possibility becomes apparent that the small armed combat scenes may fit into a broader pattern of violence and display in LBA Aegean cultures.

In recent years, the concept of performance has entered archaeological thought, particularly as it relates to power and politics (e.g. Pearson and Shanks (2001); Inomata and Coben (2006); Routledge (2014). In non-literate societies, and societies in which authorities had comparatively little knowledge of their subjects, performance and spectacle may be crucial to building and maintaining power relationships.

This paper will examine the evidence for violent performances in the LBA Aegean, particularly those of armed violence. It will then use recent archaeological work on performance to consider their potential role in constructing relationships of power in LBA Aegean societies. In doing so, a new perspective will be brought to acts classified as warfare, and to their wider social significance.

**Eoghan Finn**

**Recruitment of Non-Legionary Troops from Republic to Empire**

The emergence of the Roman auxilia as a significant fighting force in the second half of the first century AD can be seen as the culmination of evolutionary processes that gradually restructured the nature of non-legionary service in the early Imperial Period. This paper will explore the processes and practices of recruiting non-legionary troops in the transition period from the late first century BC to the early first century AD, and will trace the evolution of non-legionary recruitment over the course of the early first century AD. In both the auxilia and in legionary contexts, the continuous and cyclical replacement of groups of soldiers who reached discharge at the same time has given us a wealth of epigraphic evidence, in the form of diplomas, dedicatory stones and funerary monuments, from which we can trace recruitment patterns, however this does not tell the full story. Before the emergence of the auxilia in the second half of the first century AD there is a total lack of non-legionary diplomas which obscures the nature of recruitment in the first fifty years of the first century AD. While research into recruitment of non-legionary troops has tended to focus on the epigraphic evidence, and therefore has somewhat avoided the early first century AD, this paper will analyse what we can take from the literary evidence for the late first century BC and early first century AD in order to shed light on the nature of recruitment in these periods and to investigate whether the evolution is traceable in these sources. The works of Tacitus will be the main focus for early first century AD recruitment with Caesar and Sallust providing the basis for the nature of recruitment at the end of the Republic, while some epigraphic sources will be discussed where relevant.

**Dan Chirotou**

**Strategemata and the ‘enemies of Rome’**

Authors such as Frontinus and Polyaenus present episodes that can be identified in many classical historians such as Livy and Polybius but their piece-meal and disorderly presentation that focuses on particular episodes from different perspectives and viewpoints (for example of both Romans and Carthaginians in the Second Punic War) presents a completely different picture of known historical events and figures when read against the self-same historians. The aim of this paper is to look at how the traditional enemies of Rome are presented in collections of stratagem and how their portrayal (and that of the Romans) is affected by the episodic nature and the internal order of the texts. It will aim to argue that not only are the boundaries between ‘Romans’ and ‘others’ blurred, but so also their motivations and justifications for engaging in warfare. When read back against their source-texts, the new way in which stratagems are presented offers their readers an alternative interpretation of well-known conflicts and their protagonists.

**Dr Roel Konijnendijk**

**All Courage, No Skill: Unit Cohesion and the Classical Hoplite Phalanx**

The armies of the city-states of Classical Greece consisted of military amateurs. They were called up to war without training or preparation; they formed up and fought as best they could. How could such men be forged into a reliable battle line?

Jason Crowley’s *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite* presents a persuasive case for the importance of so-called ‘horizontal’ unit cohesion – the desire of each warrior not to let his buddies down. Crowley does not emphasise, however, that this cohesive force had to make up for the almost total absence of formal institutions, command structures and regulations that generate cohesion in other ways. Greek militia armies had no regular core, no culture of discipline, and no detailed hierarchy of officers and subordinate units.

I will argue that Classical Greek authors from Thucydides to Plato were aware of the need for greater ‘vertical’ cohesion within the militia. They urged their fellow citizens to embrace military discipline and to organise their hoplites into clearly defined units led by an elaborate and respected chain of command. The Spartan example showed just how beneficial such organisation could be. However, the writings of these authors reveal that even in the final decades of the Classical period militia armies had not adopted the methods they proposed. Extensive drill, and the cohesion that comes with it, became the hallmark of the Macedonian phalanx, which ended the freedom of the Greek city-states with relative ease.

**Fernando Echeverria**

**Stásis, the gate opener. Armies on the move and the defence of settlements in Classical Greek warfare”**

Widespread views on Greek siege warfare in the Archaic and Classical periods maintain that Greek armies relied on pitched battles and avoided the attack of enemy settlements due to a combination of ideological principles and lack of skills and resources. The proximity to the walls of enemy fortresses is thus regarded as extremely dangerous for a Greek army. This paper will argue, in contrast, that armies on the move approached and targeted enemy settlements on a regular basis and that, far from avoiding that proximity, they often sought it as a proper strategy: In ancient Greece, the coercive potential of a nearby army combined in practice with the political structure and dynamics of Greek communities, increasing the chances of a fifth column emerging within the city, a faction that would collaborate with the invaders and facilitate the attack.

**Alexander Thein**

**Armed Resistance to the Sullan proscriptions of 82 B.C.**

Proscription was a system of state-sponsored violence instituted by Sulla after the civil war of 83-82 B.C. Death lists were posted in the Forum, there were official penalties and rewards for assisting or killing the proscribed, and the result was a wave of violence in which men are said to have been killed in the streets, in temples, and in their homes, either by freelance assassins or by their friends, family, or slaves. The sources focus on the fate of individuals in the city of Rome, but there are also references to armed groups of the proscribed in Italy at Nola and Volaterrae, and in the rebel provinces of Sicily, Africa, and Spain. This paper examines the fate of proscribed in Italy and beyond, in particular the role of rebel towns and armies in offering a safe haven for fugitives. A key figure is M. Perperna, who opened up Sicily as a refuge to the proscribed before establishing a naval base in Liguria and then leading the survivors of the revolt of Lepidus from Sardinia to Sertorius in Spain – a career which invites several comparisons with that of Sextus Pompey during the proscriptions of 43. A different perspective is provided by Nola and Volaterrae, two Italian towns which both came to terms with Sulla’s regime having first expelled the proscribed fugitives they had harboured. In each case the external pressure of military action created or exposed cleavages in the internal dynamics of the rebel towns. Scholarship has tended to view the military actions taken against groups of the proscribed as an epilogue to the Sullan civil war. This paper argues that they are also the product of the Sullan proscription edict, and that it was through armed resistance that proscribed fugitives had the best chances of survival.